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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20060717-CA 
v. : 
JUAN CARLOS DIAZ-AREVALO, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
ARGUMENT 
Juan Carlos Diaz-Arevalo, the defendant herein, through counsel, replies to the 
Brief of Appellee as follows: 
Point I: The defendant preserved the Rule 11 and constitutional claims for 
appeal because his argument raised the mens rea issue so that it not only put the judge on 
notice and permitted correction below; it also facilitated a ruling on the merits. 
Point II: The Utah Supreme Court has reaffirmed that, even after subsection 
(k) was added to Rule 11 in 2005, strict compliance with Rule 11 still is required when 
taking guilty pleas. Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(k). Subsection (k) does not invite a brand new 
standard of appellate review. 
Point III: The sentencing court's plain error in failing to ensure the 
defendant's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary affected substantial rights and caused 
harm. 
POINT I: THE DEFENDANT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL HIS CLAIM 
THAT THE PLEA WAS TAKEN WITHOUT INFORMING 
HIM OF THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT FOR 
DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE. 
The state argues that the defendant failed to preserve for appeal the claim that he 
pleaded guilty without being informed of the mens rea requirement for deliberate 
indifference. When examined for compliance with Rule 11, the record as a whole makes 
clear that the issue was preserved. * 
As a preliminary matter, the defendant effectively argued the motion on his own. 
The motion makes clear that the defendant himself wished to address "issues" regarding 
his guilty plea at the sentencing hearing. Id. The defendant also sought appointment of 
different counsel. R. 132:12. Defense counsel requested permission for the defendant to 
present argument, to which the court responded, "I'm happy to let him do that." R. 
132:5. After the defendant argued the motion, the court asked whether defense counsel 
wanted to argue the motion on behalf of the defendant. R. 132:11. The attorney 
responded, "I have nothing." Id. 
Turning to the issue of preservation, "[a] proper objection 'puts the judge on 
notice of the asserted error and allows the opportunity for correction at that time in the 
1
 In the alternative, the defendant also has asserted plain error. 
2
 The motion stated in pertinent part: 
Mr. Diaz-Arevalo believes that his interests have not been adequately 
represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. He does not feel as 
though counsel has substantially represented his position. Hence, 
Defendant believes his plea was not "knowingly" made. Mr. Diaz-Arevalo 
has further expressed his concerns in a letter filed with the court. He would 
also like the opportunity to address his issues at the hearing in this matter. 
R. 86. 
2 
course of the proceeding.5" State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13, 95 P.3d 276 (quoting 
Brobergv. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The grounds for a motion 
"must be 'sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness' before the trial court[.]" Id. 
(quoting State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, ^ 19, 58 P.3d 879 (internal quotations 
omitted)). 
In this case, the court clearly understood the withdrawal motion was based upon 
the defendant's claim that the shooting was an accident: 
The Court: Okay. So as I understand, there are two issues. One is 
that you think that what happened - you believe that what happened in the 
death of this young woman was an accident and so you want to clear that 
up. I mean, contest it I suppose. 
The second thing is that you think your attorney was wrong with 
some legal advice that she gave you that if you didn't accept the State's 
offer there might be greater consequences in the federal court system and 
maybe in the State court system? 
The Defendant: Yes, your Honor. 
R. 132:7-8. 
During the same hearing, the court reaffirmed its understanding that one of the two 
points asserted as support for withdrawing the plea was that "the killing of Lindsey Ray 
was an accident and he wants the opportunity to 'clear that up/ I believe were his 
words." R. 132:40. 
This conscious understanding stemmed from the defendant's repeated assertions 
that he was not guilty because the shooting was an accident. In one letter to the court, the 
defendant stated the shooting was an accident, "I made the fatal mistake of pulling out the 
gun, but not to harm her in any way." R. 78. He explained, "What happened next was an 
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accident. I had the gun pointed to the ground[,] but as she started to kick at me from 
inside our car[5] somehow her feet picked up the gun and the impact of her kicks caused 
the gun to go off." Id. He noted he was under the influence of crystal methamphetamine 
at the time. Id. He further explained: 
Your Honor, I know I was high and I was not thinking straight, but my 
intentions were not to harm her in any way. I was not making threats to her 
with the gun. But I did have it out[, and was] holding it with one hand when 
all of a sudden she started to kick at me and hit the gun in my hand. 
R. 78-79. See R. 132:4-5 (referencing the defendant's letter at the sentencing hearing 
where the withdrawal motion was argued). 
At the sentencing hearing, the defendant reiterated that he wanted to withdraw the 
guilty plea, in part, because what happened was an accident: 
Well, your Honor, I want to withdraw my plea because I want to clear myself 
up. I've been accused of a lot of things that I'm not, and I would like to clear 
that up in front of you. And what happened was an accident and I want to 
clear that up, too. And I just feel that I'm not being represented like I should 
be. 
R. 132:5. 
Later, prior to the court's final decision denying the withdrawal motion, the 
defendant explained that he confronted the victim because she would not surrender 
possession of a car he thought was rightfully his: 
Stacy Ray Fawson [the victim's sister] was there at the accident where the 
accident happened and she knows what happened. I didn't get out of the car, 
and I didn't start shooting. I asked Stacy Ray Fawson, I told her, "Look, all I 
want is my car." I did pay for the car. Unfortunately the car wasn't in my 
name yet, but I was trying to get it. . . . I asked her for my stuff I told her, 




Even the state's attorney understood that the defendant's understanding of the 
elements was at issue, expressly arguing that the defendant did indeed understand the 
charge of murder with deliberate indifference when he pleaded guilty: "The charge of 
murder was explained that it was under the theory of depraved indifference. He 
understood that." R. 132:9; see R. 132:10 ("The state would submit that he has plead 
[sic] guilty voluntarily and knowingly[.]"). 
Finally, the issue of whether the defendant was fully informed of the elements for 
depraved indifference was raised such that the court was able to address it on its merits. 
R. 132:40. The court acknowledged that the defendant wanted to withdraw the guilty 
plea in part because the shooting was an accident, and he wanted to prove he was not 
guilty. Id. 
The Court: The defendant really makes two-points [sic] in his 
request to withdraw the guilty plea. He says first of all the killing of 
Lindsey Ray was an accident and he wants the opportunity to "clear that 
up," I believe were his words. However, during the plea colloquy, that's 
when I talked to you before the entry of your plea, Mr. Diaz-Arevalo, the 
charge was explained to you. The elements of the offense were explained. 
You were asked if you understood them. And then you were asked if you 
admitted that they were true and that you were guilty of the offense and you 
said that you did. . . . At least on that occasion you were fully informed of 
what the charge was and you said that you understood it and you were 
willing to admit that you were guilty of that offense. 
R. 132:40. Thus the trial court took note of what was explained to the defendant about 
depraved indifference, and erroneously concluded that all the elements were covered. 
In sum, the defendant said he was not guilty, and thus wanted to withdraw the 
guilty plea, because the shooting was an accident. The court reviewed the plea colloquy 
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and concluded therefrom, albeit erroneously, that the defendant was informed of all the 
elements of the murder charge. The court concluded the defendant's plea was voluntary 
and knowing because he understood all the elements. Difficult to imagine is how a more 
artful presentation could have raised any further in the court's consciousness the question 
of whether the defendant was informed about and understood the essential men rea 
element. 
POINT II: STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 11 STILL IS 
REQUIRED. 
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated the strict compliance standard of review for 
Rule 11 claims in State v. Cornell, 2005 UT 28, H 18, 114 P.3d 569 - after subsection (k) 
was added (Sec. A). If this court wishes to depart from clear precedent and apply Rule 
30(a)'s harmless error standard of review, the state then would bear the weighty burden 
of proving no harm occurred (Sec. B). 
A. Strict Compliance Is Still Required. 
Strict compliance with the protections set forth in Rule 11 when taking a guilty 
plea is not merely a good idea, it is required by the constitution: '"What is at stake for an 
accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable 
in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of 
what the plea connotes and of its consequence."' State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969)). 
The 2005 addition of subsection (k) to Rule 11 merely provides that not every 
failure to strictly comply automatically compels reversal. Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(k) (2005) 
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("Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect 
substantial rights shall be disregarded.") 
The state argues that subsection (k) fundamentally alters the approach Utah 
appellate courts must take when reviewing Rule 11 claims. A review of Supreme Court 
precedent undermines the state's invitation to adopt brand new standards. Since the 
Court in Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312, 1313-14, required strict Rule 11 compliance, it has 
eschewed a formulistic approach where every violation automatically requires reversal, 
instead favoring a more pragmatic approach: 
Our goal in requiring strict compliance with rule 11(e) is to ensure that 
defendants understand their rights and the consequences of pleading guilty. 
See Visser, 2000 UT 88 at \ 11, 22 P.3d 1242. We do not want to 
"overshadow[ ] or undermine[ ] [that goal] by [requiring adherence to] 
formalistic ritual." Id. Therefore, we hold that the test of whether a district 
court strictly complies with rule 11(e) is not whether the court recites the 
phrases found in that rule. Rather, the test is whether the record adequately 
supports the district court's conclusion that the defendant had a conceptual 
understanding of each of the elements of rule 11(e). 
State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at ^ 18 (emphasis added; alteration in original). 
Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court decided Corwell, supra, after it adopted 
subsection (k). Subsection (k) was adopted April 1, 2005. Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(k) (the 
amendment note declares, "The April 2005 amendment added Subdivision (k)); id. (the 
parenthetical immediately following Rule 1 l(k) states in pertinent part, "Amended 
effective . . . April 1, 2005[.]"). The Corwell opinion issued three weeks later, on April 
22, 2005. See 2005 UT 28. Thus the Court had already adopted Rule 1 l(k)'s 
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"substantial rights" language when it reaffirmed longstanding precedent requiring strict 
compliance with Rule 11(e).3 See Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at % 18 
When read in the context of Cornell, Rule 1 l(k) merely creates a presumption that 
where "the defendant had a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of rule 
11(e)," a failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 may not have affected substantial rights. 
Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at Tf 18; Utah R. Crim. P. In other words, substantial rights are 
affected where a defendant does not have a "conceptual understanding of the elements[.]" 
Id. As noted infra, § B, the defendant did not understand the mens rea for deliberate 
indifference, conceptually or otherwise. This affected the substantial rights set forth in 
Rule 11(e)(3),4 because they were surrendered as the result of an involuntary and 
unknowing guilty plea taken in violation of the rights set forth in Rule 11(e)(4)(A)." 
B. The Standard of Review Remains Unchanged. 
As the Supreme Court's post-amendment opinion in Corwell, supra, makes clear, 
the strict-compliance standard of review remains in force. 
In an unpublished memorandum decision, this court concluded that Rule 1 l(k) was not 
intended to overrule existing precedent, but rather to conform Rule 11 to current law: 
"Subdivision (k) was added to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure in April 
2005. . . . However, the amendments to rule 11 were 'intended to reflect current law 
without any substantive changes."5 State v. Hale, 2006 WL 2979732, *1 n.l (Utah Ct. 
App. 2006) (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee's note). 
4
 The rights delineated in Rule 11(e)(3) include the "presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, [and] the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses[.]" Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11(e)(3). 
5
 Rule 11(e)(4)(A) requires that the defendant "understand[ ] the nature and elements of 
the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is 
an admission of all those elements[.]" Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). 
8 
The state nonetheless invites this court to adopt the harmless error standard of 
review found in Rule 30(a), Utah R. Crim. P. Even were it inclined to do so, any such 
decision would not benefit the state's position on appeal. Where as here the defendant 
has offered a credible argument that error occurred, see, e.g., Br. Applt. at 27-28, the 
state would bear the burden of "persuad[ing] the court that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that absent the error" the defendant would still have pleaded guilty. See State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987). 
In Knight, the Court was required to interpret and apply the harm requirement set 
forth in Rule 30(a), which provides, "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." 734 P.2d at 919. 
There, the defendant attacked his conviction at trial because the prosecution had not 
provided promised discovery, thereby impairing his ability to defend. Id. at 914. 
Apropos to this case, the Court held that when the error causes a lack of information in 
the record from which to determine the harm caused, the state must prove the absence of 
harm. Id. at 920-21. Thus, under Rule 30(a), rather than forcing a defendant to prove 
harm based upon a lack of information caused by the error, "it seems appropriate in such 
instances to place the burden on the State to persuade the court that the error did not 
unfairly prejudice the defense." Id. at 921. 
In this case, the defendant was not told when he pleaded guilty that he was 
admitting to knowingly creating a "grave risk of death." State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 
254, 264 (Utah 1988). By contrast, the defendant repeatedly denied conduct that would 
satisfy the applicable mens rea element. E.g., R. 78-79; R. 132:5, 36-37. He explained 
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that the gun was pointed at the ground when victim's attempts to kick him caused the gun 
to rise and fire. R. 78; R. 132:37. The defendant also raised the possibility of an 
intoxication defense to the mens rea element based upon his use of methamphetamine. R. 
78-79. 
Therefore, even if this court chose to depart from Supreme Court precedent to 
apply the Rule 30(a) standard of review to Rule 11 violations, the state would have to 
prove the defendant would have pleaded guilty had he understood he was admitting to 
knowingly creating a grave risk of death. This is a burden the state cannot meet. 
POINT III: THE FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE 
MENS REA ELEMENT FOR DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE 
AFFECTED THE OUTCOME AND CAUSED HARM, 
Regardless of which standard is applied, the failure in this case to inform the 
defendant that he was admitting to knowingly causing a grave risk of death, and 
consequently that he was waiving the right to a jury trial where the mens rea would have 
to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, affected the outcome as well as the defendant's 
substantial rights. See supra, nn. 4, 5. 
A valid plea requires that the defendant understand the elements and what conduct 
meets those elements. State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1996). So that even if 
a defendant acknowledges the requirements of each element, a plea is rendered invalid by 
repeated denials of acts that would satisfy those requirements. Id. at 375. 
In Thurman, the defendant planted a bomb in a car intending to kill a man. 911 
P.2d at 372. Instead, the bomb exploded two days later, killing the man's son. Id. The 
defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder by means of a bomb. Id. 
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The statute at issue in Thurman imposed an "intentional[ ] or knowing[ ]" mens 
rea. 911 P.2d at 372 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) (1996)). The defendant had 
indeed "acknowledged . . . that aggravated murder by means of a bomb required an 
intentional or knowing killing[.]" Id. at 375. However, the subsection pertaining to 
bombs imposed a "knew, or reasonably should have known" mens rea. Id. (quoting Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1 )(1)). The defendant repeatedly denied any intent to kill the son, 
and denied knowing that the bomb "would" cause death. Id. (emphasis in original). The 
defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea because the facts he admitted did not satisfy 
the actual elements of the offense, in particular the intentional or knowing mens rea. Id. 
The motion was denied. Id. at 372. 
The crux of the Court's opinion reversing the trial court (after concluding the 
required mens rea was intentional and knowing) was its recognition that a guilty plea is 
valid only if the defendant is apprised of the precise elements and that the admitted facts 
prove the elements: u[I]n addition to confirming that the defendant understands the 
elements of the crime, the trial court must determine that the defendant 'possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts[.]'" Thurman, 911 P.2d at 373 (quoting 
State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983). The Court noted the confusion 
caused by the inconsistent mens rea standards, and concluded that the defendant did not 
"fully comprehend[ ] the nature and elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty." 
M a t 375. 
The state in Thurman argued that the defendant admitted possessing the required 
mens rea when he "acknowledged . . . that aggravated murder by means of a bomb 
11 
required an intentional or knowing killing[.]" Thurman at 375. The Court instead chose 
to "credit his repeated statements that he did not intend to kill [the son] and his specific 
refusal to admit that he knew the bomb would cause death." Thurman, at 375 (emphasis 
in original; alteration added). 
Regarding the mens rea element at issue in this case, except for those offenses the 
legislature declares subject to strict liability, every offense "shall require a culpable 
mental state[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2003). Deliberate indifference requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he was creating a grave risk of 
death to the victim. State v. Fontanna, 680 P.2d 1042, 1046-47 (Utah 1984). In turn, "A 
person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when 
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-103 (2003). 
In this case, the state argues that the admitted facts satisfy the mens rea element. It 
concludes that actually being told about and understanding the mens rea requirement 
would not have affected the defendant's decision to plead guilty. The foregoing analysis 
of Thurman illustrates that the state is mistaken on two counts, either of which is 
sufficient to invalidate the guilty plea. 
First, the defendant herein was never informed of the depraved indifference mens 
rea. Unlike Thurman where, despite some confusion, the defendant did "acknowledge" 
the applicable men rea, in this case neither the information, the plea affidavit, nor the plea 
colloquy mentioned the deliberate indifference mens rea. See R. 45 (amended 
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information), 67 (plea affidavit), 130:6-7 (plea colloquy). This fails the first leg of the 
Thurman test because the defendant did not understand the mens rea element. 
Second, the defendant did not admit facts that establish the mens rea element. 
While the defendant acknowledged the obvious - that the victim was shot when the gun 
was pointed at her and the trigger was pulled - he never once admitted knowing his 
actions caused a grave risk of death. To the contrary, he repeatedly stated the shooting 
was an accident. E.g., R. 78-79; R. 132:5, 36-37. He repeatedly described actions 
entirely inconsistent with any such knowledge. R. 78 (the gun was pointed at the ground 
when the victim kicked at the defendant, resulting in the accidental shooting); R. 132:37 
(same). Further undermining any claim that the defendant admitted facts sufficient to 
satisfy the knowledge mens rea, the defendant was high on methamphetamine and "was 
not thinking straight" when the shooting occurred, thus raising a possible intoxication 
defense. R. 77-78. 
Simply stated, the defendant herein was not apprised of any mens rea element. 
Nor did he admit "facts sufficient to support" the mens rea element. Thurman, 911 P.2d 
at 375. Rather, he "repeated[ly]" asserted facts entirely inconsistent with the mens rea 
element. Id. (emphasis in original). The state's argument that the defendant admitted 
facts that satisfy the mens rea element and, therefore, failing to inform him of the element 
itself was harmless, must be rejected. 
The state also suggests without citation to the record that the defendant pleaded 
guilty because of the strength of the case against him; inferring therefrom that knowing 
the elements would not have changed the defendant's decision. This ignores the reality 
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that the defendant did indeed seek to withdraw the guilty plea, any such evidence 
notwithstanding. 
Finally, the state argues that the defendant pleaded guilty because he wanted to 
avoid convictions on the charges dropped in the plea agreement; thus knowing the 
elements would not have changed his decision. The sentencing court did indeed find that 
one reason the defendant sought to withdraw the plea was because he concluded the 
reduced time might not be as great as he at first believed. R. 132:41 (concluding that the 
defendant would not be allowed to "second-guess [his] attorney's advice" regarding the 
benefits of the plea deal).6 
However, the court also found that the first reason the defendant moved to 
withdraw his plea was because he wanted to prove the shooting was an accident. R. 
132:40. The defendant acknowledged standing in front of the victim holding a shotgun 
pointed at the ground, but explained that it discharged and struck her when "she started 
kicking at [him]." E.g., R. 132:37. The defendant's repeated claims that the shooting 
was an accident constitute repeated assertions that he did not knowingly cause a grave 
risk of death. The defendant thus denied knowingly causing a grave risk of death. 
6
 Do not the vast majority of plea agreements, including those later invalidated for Rule 
11 violations, drop or lower charges in exchange for a guilty plea? 
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CONCLUSION 
This case should be remanded and the defendant permitted to withdraw the guilty 
John Pace 
Nisa J. Sisneros 
Attorneys for the Defendant/Appellant 
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